Aydin Aysu
Biography
Dr. Aysu received his B.S degree in microelectronics engineering with a mathematics minor and his M.S degree in electrical engineering from Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey. He received his Ph.D. degree in computer engineering from Virginia Tech and was a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Texas at Austin before he joined NC State. Dr. Aysu conducts research on cybersecurity with an emphasis on hardware-based security. The focus of his research is the development of secure systems that prevent advanced cyber attacks targeting hardware vulnerabilities. To that end, his research interests cover applied cryptography, computer architecture, and digital hardware design. He also works on cybersecurity education and the societal impacts of cybersecurity.
Education
-
Ph.D.
2016
Computer Engineering
Virginia Tech -
Master's
2010
Electrical Engineering
Sabanci University, Turkey -
Bachelor's
2008
Microelectronics Engineering
Sabanci University, Turkey
Research Focus
Recent Publications
- A Hardware-Software Co-Design for the Discrete Gaussian Sampling of FALCON Digital Signature (2024)
- Extended Abstract: Pre-Silicon Vulnerability Assessment for AI/ML Hardware (2024)
- Leaking secrets in homomorphic encryption with side-channel attacks (2024)
- RD-FAXID: Ransomware Detection with FPGA-Accelerated XGBoost (2024)
- Hardware-Software Co-design for Side-Channel Protected Neural Network Inference (2023)
- SS-AXI: Secure and Safe Access Control Mechanism for Multi-Tenant Cloud FPGAs (2023)
- Apple vs. EMA Electromagnetic Side Channel Attacks on Apple CoreCrypto (2022)
- FAXID: FPGA-Accelerated XGBoost Inference for Data Centers using HLS (2022)
- Guarding Machine Learning Hardware Against Physical Side-channel Attacks (2022)
- High-Fidelity Model Extraction Attacks via Remote Power Monitors (2022)
Highlighted Awards
- NSF CAREER Award (2020)
- University Faculty Scholars (2024)
- Bennett Faculty Fellow Award (2020)
Awards & Honors
- 2020 - Best Paper Award, Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference
- 2019 - Faculty Research and Professional Development Award (FRPD), NC State
- 2019- NSF Research Initiation Initiative (CRII) Award
- 2019- Best Paper Award, ACM Great Lake Symposium on VLSI, Microelectronic Systems Education
- 2019- Best Student Paper Nominee, IEEE International Conference on Hardware Security and Trust
- 2018- Best Paper Nominee, IEEE International Conference on Hardware Security and Trust
- 2017- Top 50 Article, IEEE Embedded System Letters
Recent News
Researchers Demonstrate New Technique for Stealing AI Models
Posted on December 17, 2024 | Filed Under: AI/ML and Research
Researchers have demonstrated the ability to steal an AI model without hacking into the device where the model was running.
Aysu and Lobaton Named University Faculty Scholars
Posted on February 20, 2024 | Filed Under: Faculty
NC State’s 2023-24 class of University Faculty Scholars was announced today. These 22 early- and mid-career faculty receive this designation in recognition of their outstanding academic achievements and contributions to NC State through the …
ECE Students Win Best Poster Award from CAEML
Posted on January 13, 2023 | Filed Under: News
Priyank Kashyup and Yuejiang Wen each won the Best Poster Award at CAEML’s Fall 2022 Semiannual Meeting.
Media Mentions
Securing Cryptography in the Quantum Computing Era
January 27, 2023
Researchers Demonstrate They Can Steal Data During Homomorphic Encryption
June 13, 2022
Homomorphic encryption allows third parties and third-party technologies to conduct operations on encrypted data. Homomorphic encryption is appealing because it preserves data privacy but allows users to make use of the data. It is considered a next-generation data security technology, but researchers have identified a vulnerability that could allow threat actors to steal data even as it is being encrypted.
A group of academics from the North Carolina State University and Dokuz Eylul University have demonstrated “the first side-channel attack on homomorphic encryption” that could be exploited to leak data as the encryption process is underway.
Researchers Demonstrate New Side-Channel Attack on Homomorphic Encryption
March 3, 2022
A group of academics from the North Carolina State University and Dokuz Eylul University have demonstrated what they say is the “first side-channel attack” on homomorphic encryption that could be exploited to leak data as the encryption process is underway. “Basically, by monitoring power consumption in a device that is encoding data for homomorphic encryption, we are able to read the data as it is being encrypted,” Aydin Aysu, one of the authors of the study, said. “This demonstrates that even next generation encryption technologies need protection against side-channel attacks.”